Abstract-We consider a single-cell downlink massive MIMO system in the presence of an adversary capable of jamming and eavesdropping. We show that, classical attacks of eavesdropping and data jamming can be simultaneously rendered useless. Specifically, we show that, the secure degrees of freedom (DoF ) attained in the presence of classical attacks is as same as the maximum DoF attained under no attack. We propose a novel beamforming strategy that establishes information theoretic security without need to Wyner encoding. We next introduce a new attack strategy that involves jamming pilot signals and eavesdropping in succession. We show that under such an attack, the maximum secure DoF is equal to zero. Furthermore, the maximum achievable rates of users vanish even in the asymptotic regime in number of base station (BS) antennas. We develop counter strategies for this new attack in which we use secret key to encrypt the pilot sequence. We show that hiding the training signal assignments from the adversary enables the users to achieve a secure DoF , identical to the one achieved under no attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive MIMO is one of the highlights of the envisioned 5G communication systems. In massive MIMO paradigm, the base station is equipped with a number of antennas, typically much larger than the number of users served. Combined with a TDD-based transmission, this solves many of the issues pertaining channel state information. In particular, the base station exploits law-of-large-numbers-like certainties as it serves each user over a combination of a large number of channels.
While many issues behind the design of multicellular massive MIMO systems have been studied thoroughly, security of massive MIMO has not been actively addressed. Part of the reason for this may be the fact that, there is a vast literature on the security of MIMO systems in general, and a common perspective is that massive MIMO is merely an extension of MIMO as it pertains to security. However, we demonstrate that massive MIMO has unique vulnerabilities, and standard approaches to MIMO security do not address them directly. Instead, these approaches focus on issues that massive MIMO is naturally immune to. Furthermore, we argue that, common models used in MIMO security eliminate the need to think on various components of the system that are critical to understanding the vulnerabilities in security. In particular, in massive MIMO, merely making assumptions on available channel state information (CSI) is not sufficient, since the actual technique the system uses to obtain CSI may be the lead cause for some major security issues. For all these reasons, security of massive MIMO calls for a separate treatment of its own.
To that end, we consider the TDD-based single cell downlink massive MIMO system developed in [3] and later readdressed in [1] . In the sequel, we first show how massive MIMO is naturally resilient to standard jamming and eavesdropping attacks, unless jamming is done during the training phase when pilot signals are transmitted by the mobile users. We prove that, without pilot jamming, the achievable secure degrees of freedom 1 (DoF ) is identical to the maximum DoF attained under no attack, even without the need to use a stochastic (e.g., Wyner) secrecy encoder in the massive MIMO limit. On the other hand, as we will show, the adversary can reduce the maximum secure DoF and rate to zero by contaminating the pilot signal of the targeted user via another correlated pilot signal. To address this attack, we develop a defense strategy in which the base station (BS) shuffles the assignment of pilot signals to the users and informs the assignments to the users via encrypted communication. Thus, in our approach, we use encryption in the training phase, which will eliminate the need for subsequent securing of data via stochastic encoding or encryption. We also discuss how the consequences of pilot encryption is fundamentally different from those of data encryption. In particular, we argue that, even if we use non-information theoretic key generation methods (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) to generate the pilot encryption keys, the level of security we achieve can be as strong as information theoretic secrecy for all practical purposes. We next present the technical contributions of the paper:
• We evaluate the maximum secure DoF when the adversary jams and eavesdrops the downlink data communication and keeps silent during the training and show that the maximum secure DoF is identical to the maximum DoF achieved in the presence of no adversary.
• We provide a novel encoding strategy, δ-conjugate beamforming, that provides full equivocation, without the need for Wyner encoding [10] under the attack model described in the previous item. The proposed encoding 1 Our definition of degrees of freedom is different from the standard definition. Our definition specifies how the achievable rate scales with the log of the number of base station antennas, rather than the log of the transmission power as in the standard definition.
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978-1-4673-7876-5/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE is based on the fact that there is zero-correlation between the estimated BS-to-user channel gains and the BS-toadversary channel gains when the adversary does not jam during the training phase.
• We observe that in order to cause a non-zero correlation between the estimated BS-to-user channel gains and the BS-to-adversary channel gains, it is sufficient for the adversary to contaminate the pilots of a users. We show that, if there exists a non-zero correlation between the BS-to-adversary channel gain and the estimated gain of the channel from the BS to a user, the adversary reduces the maximum secure DoF to zero. Further, we show that, if the amount of the correlation is sufficiently large, the maximum achievable rate of the user also vanishes as the number of antennas at the BS grows.
• We propose a counter strategy for the adversarial jamming during the training phase. We show that, if the length of the pilot signals scales with the number of antennas at the BS and the BS is able to keep the training signal assignments hidden from the adversary, attained secure DoF is equal to the maximum DoF attained under no attack.
Related Work: Massive MIMO concept was first proposed in [3] , [4] . Since then, there has been a flurry of studies focusing on different aspects of massive MIMO (see survey [5] ) such as channel estimation, energy efficiency, and pilot contamination. However, while MIMO security has been an active area of research [6] , [7] , [8] , issues specific to massive MIMO have not been considered. Among the very few, in [9] , the authors consider downlink multi cell massive MIMO system in the presence of an adversary that only eavesdrops. In order to confuse the adversary, the BS transmits artificial noise from a set of its antennas. The authors conclude that, if the adversary has sufficiently large number of antennas, it is impossible to operate at a positive rate with artificial noise generation at the BS.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a multi user MIMO downlink communication system, depicted in Figure 1 , including a base station (BS), K single-antenna users, and an adversary. The BS equipped with M antennas wishes to broadcast K distinct messages [W 1 , . . . , W K ] each of which is intended for a different user. The adversary, equipped with M e antennas is capable of eavesdropping and jamming simultaneously the communication between the BS and the users at a given time.
We assume all the channels in our system, illustrated in Figure 1 , are block fading. In the block fading channel model, time is divided into discrete blocks each of which contains T channel uses. The channel gains remain constant within a block and the channel gains on different blocks are independent and identically distributed. Furthermore, we assume the channels are reciprocal; the instantaneous gain of the channel connecting the BS to a user is as same as the gain of the channel connecting to the same user to the BS.
We follow a TDD-based two-phase transmission scheme introduced in [11] and is re-adressed in [1] . The signal transmission in a block is separated into two phases: training phase and data communication phase. On the first T r channel uses of every block, each user sends training pilots to the BS. The BS estimates each BS-to-user channel from the observed training signals. On the last T d channel uses of each block (T d T − T r ), the BS transmits data to the users.
The observed signals during a data communication phase at k-th user and at the adversary at a particular channel use of i-th block are as follows 2 :
where Y k is a received complex signal at k-th user, Z is a received M e × 1 complex vector at the adversary, and X denotes M × 1 complex vector of transmitted data symbols. Signals V k and V e are additive Gaussian noise components, distributed as CN(0, 1) and CN(0, I Me ), respectively. Signal V j denotes M e × 1 complex vector of jamming signal and is distributed as CN(0, ρ j I Me ), where ρ j is the jamming power. Further, H k (i) and H jam k (i) denote a 1 × M complex gain vector of the channel connecting the base station to k-th user, a 1 × M e complex gain vector of the channel connecting the adversary to k-th user, respectively, at i-th block. Similarly, H e (i) is the M e × M complex gain matrix of the MIMO channel connecting the base station to the adversary at i-th block. We assume that all channel gains H e (i),
The users send pilots in the first T r channel uses of each block. The received signals at the BS and at the adversary in the training phase of i-th block are as follows:
where Y Tr and Z Tr denote M × T r and M e × T r complex matrices of the received signals over T r channel uses at the BS and at the adversary, respectively. Signals W and W e are M × T r and M × T d complex matrices denoting the additive Gaussian noise. Each element of W and W e are i.i. d CN(0, 1) . Signal φ k is 1×T r complex vector denoting the training signal sequence associated with k-th user. The power of pilot signals ρ r , i.e.,
We assume that the users do not have the knowledge of the BS-to-user channel gains. Note that the BS, the users, and the adversary know pilot signal set [φ 1 , . . . , φ K ]. The adversary is assumed to be aware of which pilot signal is assigned to which user. Utilizing the pilot signals, the BS estimates the BS-touser channel gains. DefineĤ
, and H B jam as the gains of the BS-touser channels, the estimated gains of the BS-to-user channels, the gains of the BS-to-adversary channel, and the gains of the adversary-to-user channels over B blocks, respectively, i.e., H 
where
, respectively, and each element of matrix H e is i.i.d CN (0, 1).
The adversary has the perfect knowledge of the BS-to-user channel gains H and the estimated BS-to-user channel gainŝ H. Define H km andĤ km as the gain and the estimated gain of the channel connecting m-th BS antenna to k-th user. We assume that for any k ∈ [1 : K], {H kmĤkm } m≥1 forms an i.i.d process. We also assume thatĤ k are independent with H l and E Ĥ kĤ * l = 0 for k = l and k, l ∈ [1 : K]. For instance; when MMSE and mutually orthogonal training signals are employed at the BS for channel estimation, these assumptions are satisfied. Also note that we do not impose these assumptions for the BS-to-adversary channels.
We consider a linear beamforming scheme. Specifically, the BS uses a conjugate beamforming and the transmitted signal at any channel use can be written as:
where s k is the complex data signal of k-th user and α k
The BS aims to send message w k ∈ W k , k = 1, . . . , K, to k-th user over B blocks with rate R k , while keeping w k secret from the adversary. The BS and the users employ code
satisfying an average power constraint such that
for all w k ∈ W K , where the notation (i, j) indicates the j-th channel use of i-th block, ρ k denotes the power constraint for k-th user. Note that ρ f K k=1 ρ k is the cumulative average transmission power. Further, note that encoding functions, f k , k = 1, . . . , K can be deterministic or stochastic functions. 3) A linear beamforming (e.g., conjugate beamforming) matrix that maps data signals 3 s
where W k is uniformly distributed on W k . We assume that the adversary targets a single user during communication. The secrecy of a transmitted message for k-th user is measured by the equivocation rate at the adversary, which is equal to the entropy rate of transmitted message w k conditioned on the adversary's observations. Definition 1. A secure rate tuple R 1 , . . . R K is said to be achievable if, for any > 0, there exists B( ) > 0 and a sequence of codes 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d that satisfy the following:
3 Note that s
B,j=Tr +1:T and notation (·) BT d applied to any variable has the same meaning. 4 Note that the channel input sequence satisfies the following average power constraint:
where the expectation is over estimated channel gainsĤ. The inequality (8) follows from the individual power constraint (7) and from the fact that E Ĥ kĤ * l = 0 for k = l 2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
for all B ≥ B( ), where Z BT is the received signal sequence at the adversary over BT channel uses.
Notice that the achievable rate tuple definition above is presented for a given M , i.e., M remains constant for a sequence of codes 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d , B ≥ B( ). In this paper, we mainly focus on the massive MIMO limit, i.e., how achievable rate tuple R 1 , . . . , R K behaves as M goes to infinity. To that end, we use the following notion of degrees of freedom for each user. 
In the literature, degrees of freedom is typically defined as the limit lim ρ k →∞ R k log ρ k . Since, we aim to understand how R k changes with M under constant ρ k , the degree of freedom definition in (12) is more relevant for our interest.
For a given achievable secure degrees of freedom tuple d 1 , . . . , d K , we define the secure degrees of freedom of the downlink communication as the minimum value in the tuple, i.e., secure DoF
In the rest of the paper, when we use secure DoF , we mean secure degrees of freedom attained in the presence of an adversary, and when we use DoF , we mean degrees of freedom attained under no adversary.
In this paper, we characterize the maximum secure DoF in the presence of various security attacks including data eavesdropping and jamming and training signal jamming. Furthermore, we aim to develop defense strategies that achieve the maximum DoF against the security attacks that would limit the maximum secure DoF to zero, otherwise.
III. ADVERSARY NOT JAMMING THE TRAINING PHASE
In this section, we show the downlink communication in the massive MIMO system is resilient to the adversary not jamming the training phase. Specifically, in Theorem 1, we evaluate the maximum secure DoF of the downlink communication in the presence of the adversary that jams only during the data communication phase and eavesdrops both training and data communication phases. We call this attack model as no training-phase jamming. Then, with the following remark, we show that, the maximum secure DoF attained in the presence of such a security attack is as same as the maximum DoF attained when there is no security attack. This result indicates the weakness of the aforementioned security attack when the BS has many antennas.
In the sequel, we present a novel encoding strategy, called δ-conjugate beamforming, that secures the downlink communication without a need to use stochastic encoding functions, f k , k = 1, . . . , K, which are the essential part of information theoretic security establishing strategies in the literature, e.g., Wyner encoding [10] . Specifically, we show that for a given B > 0, any code 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d utilizing δ-conjugate beamforming and deterministic mapping functions satisfy the security constraint (11) 
The complete proof is available in the technical report [19] , where we first provide an upper bound on secure DoF and then present a strategy to achieve the upper bound. Here, we provide a proof sketch. In order to find an upper bound on secure DoF , we consider a multiple output single output (MISO) communication system without an adversary, in which the BS communicates to a single user under power constraint ρ f . Further, we assume that the BS and the user have a perfect information of the channel gains. We show that the supremum of achievable rates leads to a DoF of
T . Hence, we conclude that
T is an upper bound on secure DoF attained in the multi user downlink communication model in Section II.
We now describe a strategy to attain the maximum secure DoF in Theorem 1. On the first T r channel uses of each block, the users send training sequences that are mutually orthogonal. The BS uses minimum mean square estimator (MMSE) to estimate the BS-to-user channel gains. The BS constructs K codebooks, c k , k = 1, . . . , K, where codebook c k contains 2 BTR k independently and identically generated codewords, s
The BS maps k-th user's message to a codeword with a stochastic mapping function f k . Specifically, the BS maps message w k ∈ 1 : 2 BT R k to randomized message m k ∈ 1 : 2 BTR k as in [10] and then maps randomized message m k to one of the codewords in c k , k = 1, . . . , K. Utilizing the conjugate beamforming in (6), the BS maps K codewords, s
Each user employs typical set decoding [12] . In order to show that security constraint (11) for a particular user is satisfied, we give the adversary the other users' transmitted codewords. 2
In the next couple of remarks, we emphasize the robustness of the downlink communication system against the adversaries jamming only the data communication phase and eavesdropping both training and data communication phases. T is achieved is that the adversary keeps silent during the training phase and hence, the estimated BS-to-user channel gains are independent with H e . On the next section, we consider an adversary jamming the training phase. In the presence of such an adversary, the BS-to user channel gains become correlated with H e and the maximum secure DoF is constrained to zero. 2
Remark 2. (Resource race between the BS and the adversary)
In [19] , we show that the achievable rate tuple that leads to a secure DoF of
. We next investigate how R k varies in M e and M . Figure 2 illustrates this variation when ρ k = 1, ρ f = 10,
99, ρ j = 1, and a = 0.9. As seen in Figure 2 , in the presence of the adversary not jamming the training phase, the achievable secure rates are determined as a result of the arms race between the adversary and the BS. Specifically, we can observe that if M e remains constant, achievable secure rate R k grows unboundedly as M is increasing. Moreover, for a fixed value of M , the achievable rates decrease as a function of M e . In the next section, we consider an adversary jamming the training phase instead of keeping silent during the training phase. We will show that, armed with only a single antenna, the adversary is capable of limiting the maximum achievable rate for any user to zero as M → ∞. Hence, by jamming the training phase, the adversary converts the arms race between the BS and itself to the one between an user and itself.
2
In our achievability strategy we use in the proof of Theorem 1, we harness a stochastic encoding, a randomized mapping of each message to a codeword with stochastic mapping functions, f k , k = 1, . . . , K, at the BS. In fact, stochastic encoding, e.g., Wyner encoding [10] , is a standard technique in the literature for establishing security against the eavesdropping attacks. In the rest of the section, we anlayze a novel encoding technique, called δ-conjugate beamforming, that satisfies the security constraint in (11) without need to stochastic encoding functions when the BS has sufficient large number of antennas. Let δ be a positive real number. When the BS employs δ-conjugate beamforming, the transmitted signal at a particular channel use can be written as
Note that when δ = 0, the conjugate beamforming in (6) is identical with δ-conjugate beamforming in (13) .
With the following theorem, we show that, when code 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d of length BT d utilizes δ-conjugate beamforming as a form of linear beamforming, the code satisfies the security constraint in (11) for any k ∈ [1 : K] and for any > 0 without a need for stochastic encoding. 
any code 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d employing δ-conjugate beamforming and not employing a stochastic encoding satisfies
for all B ≥ 1, where W k is uniformly distributed on 1 :
In Theorem 2, S( ) can be considered as the required number of the BS antennas to make the conditional entropy -close to R k for all k ∈ [1 : K]. Hence, the BS equipped with at least S( ) antennas can satisfy (14) by harnessing any code 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d that employs deterministic encoding functions and δ-conjugate beamforming.
The proof is available in [19] . The BS constructs K codebooks, c k , k = 1, . . . , K, where codebook c k contains 2 BT R k codewords, s codeword with a deterministic function, f k , k = 1, . . . , K. Utilizing the δ-conjugate beamforming in (13), the BS maps K codewords, s
In Figure 3 , we illustrate the change of S( ) with when Theorem 2, we only emphasize the impact of δ-beamfoming on the security. The following remark takes both the security and probability error constraints into account. 
where δ is the parameter of δ-conjugate beamforming and 0 < δ < 1.
Suppose that number of antennas at the BS M is greater than max (V (R), S( )), where S( ) is defined in the statement of Theorem 2. In [19] , we show that there exists B( ) > 0 and a sequence of codes 2 BT R1 , . . . , 2 BT R K , BT d that satisfy the constraints in (10) and (11) for B ≥ B( ) and do not employ stochastic encoding.
IV. ADVERSARY JAMMING THE TRAINING PHASE
In the previous section, we show that the adversary not jamming during the training phase does not degrade the performance of the multi user communication when the BS has sufficiently large number of antennas. In this section, we aim to find attack method that do degrade the performance. Specifically, we focus on finding an attack strategy capable of limiting secure DoF to an arbitrarily small value. Next theorem sheds light on finding such an attack strategy. The maximum secure DoF is zero if E H * emĤkm = 0 2
Note that random vectorH
B is created by replacingĤ
. The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in [19] . In the example given at the end of this section, we show that the assumptions listed in Theorem 3, that are related to the random variables hold when MMSE and mutually orthogonal pilot signals are used as a channel estimation strategy. Note that such an estimation strategy is quite popular in the multiuser communication [4] .
We next give a proof sketch. Assuming that a conjugate beamforming is used at the BS, we can convert the communication set-up explained in Section II to an identical set-up containing a BS equipped with K antennas. In the new set-up, the gain of the channel connecting k-th antenna to l-th user is H lĤ * k , k, l = 1, . . . , K and the gain of the channel connecting k-th antenna to the adversary is H eĤ * k , k = 1, . . . , K. Note that, following the second assumption in Theorem 3, the gain of the channel connecting k-th antenna to the adversary can be replaced with H kĤ * 1 , . . . , H kH * k , . . . , H kĤ * K . The transmitted signal at k-th antenna, k = 1, . . . , K, represents the data signal for k-th user S k . In [19] , we bound R k as follows
. . , H kĤ * K is 1 × K complex gain vector of channels connecting the BS to k-th user, and A e H kĤ * 1 , . . . , H kH * k , . . . , H kĤ * K is 1×K complex gain vector of channels connecting the BS to the adversary. Let Σ be the covariance matrix of input signal S = [S 1 , . . . , S k ] and S be the feasible set for the maximization problem in (15) . Every matrix Σ in set S is diagonal due to fact that S 1 , . . . , S K are independent, and satisfy Σ diag(ρ 1 , . . . , ρ 2 ) due to the power constraint in (7) . We show that if E H * km H em = 0, then the right hand side (RHS) of (15) over log M goes to zero as M → ∞. Hence, the maximum secure DoF becomes zero.
In addition to limiting the maximum secure DoF to zero, the adversary can make the maximum achievable rate of k-th user arbitrarily small as M → ∞. We next provide the conditions under which the maximum achievable secure rate of k-th user goes to a finite value as M → ∞. Corollary 1. A user's maximum achievable rate is bounded as M → ∞) In addition to the assumptions given in Theorem 3, assume that there exits a finite non negative r such that p K M (x) ≤ r for all M ≥ 1 and x ∈ K M , where p K M is the probability density function of
2 and K M is the sample space of K M . Then, the achievable rate of k-th user is bounded as
2 The proof of Corollary 3 can be found in [19] . As seen in Corollary 1, if the amount of correlation between the BS-tok-user channel gain and the estimated BS-to-k-user channel gain, E H kmĤ * km is smaller than that between the BS-toadversary channel gain and estimated BS-to-k-th user channel gain, E H emĤ * km , the maximum achievable rate of k-th user vanishes as M → ∞. 
In order to have a non-zero correlation between the gain of the channel connecting itself to the BS H e withĤ k for any k ∈ [1 : K], the adversary has to jam the training phase. Hence, by jamming the training phase, the adversary is capable of limiting the maximum DoF and secure achievable rates to zero. 2
Remark 5. (Resource race between the adversary and the user) We show that, if there exists a non zero correlation between the BS-to-k-user channel gain and the BS-to-adversary channel gain, then the maximum secure DoF is constrained to zero. Furthermore, we also show that if the amount of this correlation is higher than the amount of the correlation between the BS-to-adversary channel gain and estimated BSto-k-user channel gain, the maximum achievable rate of k-th user goes to zero as M → ∞. Hence, in the presence of the adversary jamming the training phase, the secure achievable rates and the maximum secure DoF are determined as a result of the arms race between the adversary and a single user.
Example: (Using MMSE and mutually orthogonal training signals for channel estimation) We study an adversary that chooses to match k-th user's pilot sequence on the training phase with one of its antennas when MMSE and mutually orthogonal training signals are used for channel estimation.
We show that the assumptions given in Theorem 3 are valid under such a jamming attack and a channel estimation strategy. Then, we show that the maximum secure DoF is zero.
We consider mutually orthogonal training signals
for any k, l ∈ [1 : K]. The received signals at the BS in the training phase of i-th block is as follows:
where ρ j is the jamming power. Note that we assume that the adversary jams the data communication phase and the training phase with the same power, which is ρ j . In order to validate the assumptions listed in Theorem 3, we next present the estimated gain of the channel connecting the BS to l-th user at i-th block aŝ
where 
Further, defineĤ l aH l + bH e + cW l if k = l, and otherwise,Ĥ l dH l + eW l . Note thatH k (i), H(i), H e (i),Ĥ(i) is an i.i.d process due to (5) and the associated joint distribution is identical with that of H k , H, H e ,Ĥ whereH k aH k + bH e + cW k . Hence, we conclude that the joint probability distribution of H(i),H(i) is identical for any i ∈ [1 : B].
We next show that the probability distribution of H B e ,Ĥ B is identical with that of H B k ,H B . Note that both (H e ,Ĥ k ) and (H k ,H k ) are independent with {Ĥ l } l =k . Hence, noting that H e and H k have same probability distributions, it is sufficient to show thatH k |H k = h k has the same probability distribution withĤ k |H e = h k for any h k ∈ R M :
for any x ∈ R M , where (22) and (24) follows from the fact that H e , H k , and W k are mutually independent and (23) follows from the fact that (H e , W ) and (H k , W ) are identically distributed.
Finally, note that {H em ,Ĥ km } m≥1 forms an i.i.d process due to the fact that H k , H e , W k are mutually independent random vectors and each is composed of M i.i.d complex Gaussian random variables.
Note that E Ĥ * km H em = b. Since E Ĥ * km H em is nonzero, we conclude that the maximum secure DoF is zero by Theorem 3.
V. A COUNTER STRATEGY
In the previous section, we showed that massive MIMO systems are vulnerable to the training phase jamming attack. We showed that the adversary can limit the maximum secure DoF to zero by the jamming the training phase. Further, by choosing a jamming power higher than the training power, the adversary is also capable of making the maximum achievable secure rate of a particular user zero as M → ∞. In this section, in order to counter the training phase jamming attack, we provide a defense strategy that expands the number of pilot signals and keeps the pilot signal assignments hidden from the adversary. In Theorem 4, subject to some conditions, the secure DoF of
T can be attained with the proposed defense strategy. Next, we describe the defense strategy and then provide Theorem 4 with its proof.
The BS constructs pilot signal set Φ containing L mutually orthogonal pilot signals, i.e., Φ = [φ 1 , . . . , φ L ], where L is larger than the number of users in the system, L ≥ K. Thus, both the number and the length of the sequence is increased. At the beginning of each block, the BS draws K pilot signals from set Φ uniformly at random and assigns each of them to a different user. Let Φ K (i) = [φ 1 (i), . . . , φ K (i)] be K pilot signals that the BS picks at the beginning of i-th block, where φ k (i) is the pilot signal assigned to k-th user on ith block. Define id k (i) as the identity of pilot signal φ k (i), k = 1 . . . , K.
We assume that the BS shares with each user random log L bits, that is unknown by the adversary. Using the random keys, the BS encrypts id k (i), k = 1, . . . , K and sends the encrypted identity over a public error free channel. Decrypting the signal coming over a public free channel, the user identifies the pilot signal that the BS assigns to it. Hence, sharing random and secure bits with each user enable the BS to keep pilot signal assignments hidden from the adversary. Note that the BS requires K log L random bits.
Suppose that the adversary targets k-th user without loss of generality. The adversary, without knowing which pilot signal is assigned to which user, jams every pilot signal in set Φ with an equal power. Particularly, the adversary divides its jamming power and jams with M e antennas each training signal with jamming power public/private keys. Such keys can be generated by standard private key based methods (e.g., Diffie-Hellman) or public key based methods (e.g., RSA). Thus, it only relies on existing standard computational cryptographic techniques and does not rely on information-theoretic techniques for key sharing. Next we explain why this is sufficient for secrecy in the case of pilot encryption to achieve required security.
Note that, encrypting the training sequence is fundamentally different from encrypting data. In data encryption, the adversary can record the signal and use cryptanalysis to decrypt it, no matter how long it may take. Indeed, the main motivation for the use of information theoretic security is that, it provides provable secrecy, independently of the computational power of the attackers. Here, unlike data cryptanalysis, adversary has to break and decrypt the training sequence immediately after it is communicated, or it is useless. Indeed, the adversary needs the assigned key to influence the beamforming; otherwise the data signal it receives will have an equivocation rate, arbitrarily close to the rate of the message. Even an adversary with an extremely powerful network of quantum computers, immediate cryptanalysis of key assignment becomes impractical. Since we can renew the assignments for each coherence time, our approach can be considered to be secure against attackers that have almost arbitrarily large computational powers. Thus, we enjoy the benefits of almost perfect secrecy, without the computational and delay costs associated with information theoretic security.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the physical-layer security of massive MIMO downlink communication. We show that secure DoF attained in the presence of the attacks not jamming the pilot signals is as same as the DoF attained under no attack. This result shows the robustness of the massive MIMO systems to eavesdropping and data jamming attacks. Further, we propose a joint power allocation and beamforming strategy, called δ-conjugate beamfoming, which establishs information theoretic security without a need to use Wyner codes at the massive MIMO limit. We next show the weakness of massive MIMO systems against the attacks that jam the pilot signals. Specifically, we show that the maximum secure DoF is zero if the adversary contaminates the pilot signals. We present defense strategies against pilot contamination and subsequent eavesdropping. We show that if the length of the pilot signals scales in a particular way with M and the BS regularly shuffles the pilot sequence assignments, which are communicated to the mobiles in encrypted form using secret keys, a secure DoF equal to the maximum DoF attained under no attack can be attained.
